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ADVERTISING, MARKET POWER
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
THE LAWYERS' CASE
D. N. KHACTU*
High on the list of controversial economic topics stands
advertising, especially the kind of advertising undertaken by
professionals such as dentists, doctors and lawyers. The critics of
advertising claim it damages, more often than not, the interest of
the consumers, abuses their confidence, and generates abnormal
unjustified profits and sometimes vulgarizes common, social taste.
For several decades in the past history of the American Association
of Lawyers, the guild has categorically rejected advertising by its
members on the central criterion of professional ethics. The
American Bar Association has banned such activities since 1908.
For years, one could find only a handful of defenders of advertisers,
and even these spoke humbly and possibly without conviction. It
was rather risky to one's reputation of honesty and intelligence to
champion the cause of advertising among intellectual circles or in
the academic ivory tower. This rather one-sided view of the subject
matter constitutes by itself a phenomenon deserving some serious
investigation, but it lies presently outside the scope of this paper.
Recently, a fresh and somewhat revolutionary approach has
been actively sought by a new generation of young lawyers who are
willing to challenge the traditional and well-established view on
advertising so endeared by the elder confreres of their legal
fraternity. A case in point is Bates v. State Bar of Arizona' which
finally reached the door of the United States Supreme Court on
January 18, 1977. The issue was whether lawyers ought to be
*Dominique N. Khactu, Department of Economics, University of North Dakota; Diplome d'
Ingenieur des Batiments, University of Paris; B. S., College of St. Thomas; M. S., Ph. D.,
University ofMinnesota.
1. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). See High Court Justices Hear Debate on Lawyers' Ads, Los Angeles Times,
January 19, 1977, at5, col. 1.
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permitted to advertise for their professional services like any other
business. Messrs. Bates and O'Sheen operated a legal clinic in
Phoenix, Arizona, and in February 1966, they used the local
newspaper for listing their fees for a given number of standardized
legal services such as uncontested divorces, adoptions, personal
bankruptcies, etc. The Arizona State Bar brought disciplinary
proceedings against these lawyers, and the Arizona State Supreme
Court upheld the Bar's action, thus rejecting the defendants' claim
that such a ban on their advertising constituted a violation of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act and also the First Amendment guarantee
of free speech. On June 27, 1977, in an unprecedented case, the
United States Supreme Court decided, five to four, in favor of
Messrs. Bates and O'Sheen. Apparently, the majority of the Court
did not subscribe to the theory that advertising by lawyers
necessarily "cheapened" the legal profession. The decision of the
Court generated considerable consternation among the "old
guard" of the legal fraternity. These puritans of the ABA agonize
over the risk that a mass of advertising will ensue and get out of
hand, culminating in a distasteful environment where "cut-throat"
competition among lawyers will prevail. This would not fit well
with the self-image of the profession. The "middle-of-the-road"
members of the Bar would not criticize advertising per se, but con-
tinue to object to it basically on the ground that such activities will
not create any innovation which could be construed as greatly
beneficial to consumers. On the contrary, these members believe
that advertising activities will only deceive the public in the long
run. On the other side of the spectrum, a third group emerges: they
are the "activist lawyers" of the new generation wishing still more
freedom. They would reject only those advertisings that are
downright false, fraudulent, misleading or deceptive and would like
to be given almost a free rein to advertise.
What seems most lacking in the debate on advertising by
professionals is an attempt to understand the functions of
advertising itself, its uses and its impact on consumers and society
at large. Indeed, some aspects of advertising by the legal profession
pose problems of considerable intellectual challenge whose study
will aid protagonists on all sides of the debate on this subject. In this
essay, two basic issues will be examined: (1) the economic aspect of
advertising by lawyers as it relates to the market, the American
consumers and the legal industry; (2) the ethical aspect of
advertising, focusing on the observance of the code of professional
ethics, the interest of the users of legal services and the society's
welfare at large. Thus, the present paper includes four parts. The
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first presents an analysis of the nature and functions of advertising;
the second discusses advertising by lawyers, the interest of the
general public and the lawyers' code of ethics; the third presents
some empirical evidence on the impact of advertising by
professionals. Finally, the fourth part is devoted to the presentation
of a brief summary and evaluation of the findings discussed in the
preceding sections.
I. NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF ADVERTISING BY
PROFESSIONALS
It appears to the author to be inherent in the nature of the
advertising business that advertising people should be troubled
more than most participants in the economic process of our society
about the justification for their activities. For in the evaluation of
the role of advertising, our society's two conflicting standards of
professional success and integrity meet in a head-on collision; no
one is more conscious of this than the lawyer involved in
advertising himself. What is then the proper nature and basic
function of advertising? The arguments have revolved around three
major questions: (a) information vs. persuasion and control; (b)
efficiency vs. waste and unemployment; (c) competition vs.
concentration or monopoly.
Those in favor of advertising argue that it educates and
informs the buyer, the public at large, about the firm, the service,
the price. Thereby, advertising tends to make the market for legal
services, for instance, more perfect than it would otherwise be.
Well managed and properly used advertising by lawyers could
provide the information which assists consumers of legal services in
making rational choices. In a dynamic and complex society as ours,
there is an acute need for the consumer to be closely acquainted
with new firms, new services, and various improvements in the
existing legal services. Advertising then serves as a medium which
disperses such useful and needed information to the public. The
role of advertising is essentially to provide information to the
consumers. That the latter respond to advertising can be
explained by a simple model in which advertising is basically
informative. Quality variations among legal services of different
lawyers would exist even in the absence of advertising; the problem
facing the consumer is to find and choose the types of services
offering the most quality per dollar of expenditure according to
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one's own preference and needs. The public will respond to legal
advertising only if it enables them to select higher quality service
per dollar expenditure at lower costs as compared to any random
sampling or the use of alternative information sources in pur-
chasing legal services. Therefore, the central question here is not
whether advertising by professionals such as the lawyer provides
useful and needed information to the consumers. Instead, we have
to ask ourselves what are the probabilities that legal advertising will
lead to: (a) false and misleading information and (b) persuasive
rather than proper and adequate information for the public con-
sumption.
Critics of advertising point out that, in general, the basic
objective of advertising is to persuade, not to inform. Competition
will pressure lawyers to resort to advertising based upon misleading
and extravagant claims which confuse and frequently insult the
intelligence of the average consumer, not enlighten him. Little of
real value in the rendering of rational choices can be garnered from
advertising which crowds our television screens and adds bulk to
our magazines. Indeed, advertising may well persuade consumers
in some cases to pay high prices for much acclaimed, but inferior,
services, foregoing better but unadvertised legal services selling at
lower prices. One of the commonly expressed reasons for
prohibiting advertising by the legal profession is based on fear of
deception and fraud on the part of "quack" lawyers. It is alleged
that advertising messages could frequently be deceptive and even
fraudulent in some occasions. The question which arises is: Does it
really pay for a lawyer to engage in deceptive advertising? The an-
swer is provided by an elegant theoretical analysis of the economic
value of advertising by Phillip Nelson.' He suggests that all goods
and services can be classified as either "search" goods (and ser-
vices) or "experience" goods (and services).
For search goods, the qualities of the product are determined
by inspection before purchase. Clothes, furniture and fruits
provide examples of this type of product. For experience goods, the
product qualities are determined only by experience after purchase.
These are the goods that buyers must actually use before they can
tell whether these products live up to their expectations. Cars,
television sets, power tools and legal services fall into this second
category. The distinction between "search" and "experience"
qualities is fundamental to an understanding of the informative role
2. Nelson, The Economic Value ofAdvertising, in ADVERTISING AND SOCIETY, 79 (Y. Brozen. ed.,
197 4 ).
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of advertising. "Search" goods advertising contains direct
information about product qualities that enable consumers to rank
alternative brands of a given product, while "experience" goods
advertising contains no such direct information. Advertising
content of "experience" goods is just indirect information -
namely, the fact that the brand is advertised. It merely tells the
consumers which brands of legal services, for instance, are likely to
provide more utility per dollar spent. Consequently, an important
implication could be drawn from this analysis: "experience" goods
will be likely to be advertised more heavily than "search" goods.
Since legal advertising is an "experience" type, it may easily be
subject to abuses in the sense that the users may send improper
advertising messages. This fear of misleading advertising is grossly
exaggerated because of the relative consumer power in the service
market. It is true that the consumers' power over advertising is
much less for "experience" goods than for "search" goods because
false advertising of "experience" goods cannot be detected prior to
purchase. The major control consumers can exert in relation to
legal advertising is via the repeat-purchase decision. It is often very
difficult, if not impossible, for a lawyer to fool enough people to
generate enough one-time-only purchases to make an advertising
campaign pay for itself. Legal advertising campaigns involve costly
dollar expenditures. Therefore, in order to be profitable,
advertising must generate enough additional sales of legal services
over a prolonged period of time. Shoddy, fraudulent, one-time
service would not fit the long-term goal of any ambitious, decent
practicing lawyer in this case. It pays to advertise a "winner."
Only a "winner" - a lawyer that lives up to the customers'
expectations enough to generate "repeat purchases" - can sell
well enough his or her legal services to make advertising pay for
itself. Indeed, the main message communicated to the public by
repeated advertising of the established legal firms is that the
advertised services are "winners.' '3 It is rather unfair to condemn a
lawyer on the basis of the sheer size of the budget devoted for
advertising his or her legal services. As a matter of fact, within the
general context of marketing, one could expect that heavily-
advertised brands of any kind of product or service, usually are
better buys. This belief derives from the following observations:
1. More efficient firms (or lawyers) with lower costs will find
that it pays to expand sales by advertising, as well as offering lower
prices, higher quality, or both. Such behavior by efficient firms (or
3. Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78J. Poi.. Eco'N., 311 (1970).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
lawyers) can produce a positive association between advertising
and the quality per dollar spent on the given brand (or legal
service).
2. Advertising is an increasing function of the market size,
generally. Thus, consumers' utility evaluation of brands (or a given
service from specific lawyers or firms) differ. The brands (or legal
firms) that possess qualities which appeal to the most people will
have a larger market for their advertising than brands with qualities
which appeal to fewer people. Popular brands, therefore, have the
greatest incentive to advertise - and, in turn, the average
consumer has an incentive to purchase heavily advertised brands
(or legal services).
Producers of high quality brands (or legal services) have
greater incentives to advertise because, for these brands (or
services), advertising will produce a greater increase in repeat
purchases relative to original, initial purchases than for low-quality
brands (or services). This occurs, in part, because the public is
more likely to remember brands or services with names made
familiar by advertising. Also, it happens because of these brands
(or services) the consumer remembers, he or she is more likely to
again purchase those with high quality.
Having determined that deceptive advertising will not
economically benefit a lawyer, the second question can be
addressed: Does advertising by lawyers merely persuade customers
rather than inform them, thereby creating wants that result in a
distortion of "natural" preference patterns? Those who oppose
advertising in general contend that the "ideal model" of a market
does not exist. In the idealized model of an efficiently acting
competitive market mechanism, consumers are supposed to be well
informed. They recognize low quality and avoid it; they never buy
drugs that turn out to be ineffective or poisonous. Most important,
the desires of the consumers are supposed to represent genuine
"wants" and "needs." But in actual life, as Harvard professor
John Kenneth Galbraith never tires of pointing out, firms spend
much money on advertising to "shape"- and some insist - to
"distort" consumer demands. From childhood on, the public is
conditioned via advertising to desire what business firms want to
sell. The natural sequence, "consumer demand - corporate price
and production" is often inverted artificially to become "corporate
advertising - consumer demand - high price and profit." Some
observers suggest that the power of advertising is so great that it
deprives consumers of their discretion in the market place, and
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makes it possible for suppliers of services, such as lawyers,
to "manage" demand. One of the more articulate of these
observers, John Kenneth Galbraith, notes that the sellers of
services or goods "engage in the management of those who buy
goods ' 4 and services through the utilization of a vast network of
communications, and a great array of selling organizations. The
Galbraithian argument contends that advertising shapes the
demand of the public for a given product or service. Wants created
by advertising should be accorded low priority by society. "If the
individual's wants are urgent, they must be original with
himself." 5 But this ignores the fact that virtually all our wants are
learned, including those desires for high quality public services that
are acquired from too much reading of Galbraith's books. One
could not, for instance, unjustly criticize a lawyer who has become
financially successful via increased workload with wills and estate
planning preparations. Many of the newly-recruited middle aged
and modest income customers learn about the prudence and the
need of wills or estate planning through his advertising activities.
Does advertising by the lawyer alter the customers' preference in
this case? First, what is meant by "change in preferences?" One
might argue that a customer's preferences to a particular brand of
known services or goods is something sacred, that advertising
which induces him into purchases of a new and different brand
must thereby alter his preferences. While this view ought to be
suggested by a quick reading of textbooks on economic theory, it is
definitely too narrow. Taste changes of this sort raise few
substantial normative issues. People are continually learning and
thus, in the narrow textbook sense, changing their preferences.
Consequently, it does not help much to judge whether any
particular change in behavior stems from a substantial change in
preferences or whether any particular change in preferences is a
good thing. 6 Without a precise definition of preference changes, it
is obviously difficult to examine rigorously the ability of
advertising to alter preferences of the buyers. Informally, however,
we could reasonably argue that advertising cannot cause important
taste changes if it cannot cause major shifts in the pattern of
consumer spending. If we accept this test, then the evidence that
4. The view that advertising can broadly influence consumer tastes and demand, both within
and across industries, is most clearly associated with the work of John K. Galbraith. See J.
GA LBRAITH, THE NEW INOIISTRIAL STATE 200 (1967); J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS, PEACE AND
LAI CHTER 64, 73, 75-79 (1971).
5. J. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLI ENT SOCIETY 153, 158 (1958).
6. Gintis, A Radical Analysis of We/fare Economics and Individual Development, 86 Q. J. EcoN. 572
(1972).
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advertising is a powerful shaper of tastes must be considered
unconvincing. This notion is confirmed by Borden's findings: (a)
consumers' wants for products are likely determined by the
character of consumers and their existing environment; (b)
advertising does not change people's characteristics; it does change
the environment only as it has contributed indirectly over a long
period in helping a mobile society and a dynamic economy.'
Furthermore, since advertising is only a small part of the
consumers' environment, it would appear unlikely that it could be
considered a major influence on tastes and preferences. 8
Finally, the necessity of advertising has to be evaluated in the
context of our modern high-consumption, mass-production and
mass-distribution society, what J. K. Galbraith has termed the
"affluent society," and what W. W. Rostow has elevated to the
"final stage of economic development." 9 Increasing wealth means
an increasing capacity to choose between alternatives and an
increasing need to make choices. The making of choices, however,
requires information about the alternatives between which choice is
necessary; and information is an expensive commodity to acquire.
Providing information on which choices between alternative ways
of spending money are based is assigned in our society to the seller
of goods or services, rather than to the buyer, by a natural
economic process of division of labor. The main element of a
justification of advertising by lawyers is that in a dynamic and
progressive society, the consumer needs to learn how to spend his
increasing income and can afford to pay for information. There is a
common impression that legal advertising conceals more than it
reveals. This is not so if it is practiced ethically. A large number of
people are well aware that any advertising whitewash to cover up a
lawyer's failings is just as thin and impermanent as the physical
stuff. People know from experience that the truth has a way of ap-
pearing at the most embarrassing times. Undeniably, there are
some "sharp operators" among the members of the legal field just
as there are in any other. But most lawyers see the advertising role
as contributing to a more open and honest relationship between
them and the public at large. One should not expect advertising to
make a lawyer appear any more virtuous or competent than he ac-
tually is. It is a matter of first doing right, and then telling about it.
An advertising policy which sticks to this order of priority can
7. N. BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING 843-44 (1964).
8. R. SCHMALENSEE, THE ECONOMICS OF ADVERTISING § 4-5 (1972), see W. COMANOR and T.
WILSON, ADVERTISING AND MARKET POWER (1974).
9. W. ROSTOW, THE STACES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1971).
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hardly fail. In such a case, advertising could not conjure up, in the
minds of people, an image of trickery which ethical practitioners of
law strongly resent.
A second major issue of debate on the desirability of
advertising by lawyers revolves around efficiency versus waste. In a
sense, one could declare that advertising by professionals greatly
improves the welfare of the public at large. It familiarizes the
consumers with a variety of complex legal services and thereby
broadens the market for these kinds of professional services; this
not only encourages further capital investment and employment,
but also large-scale operations resulting in low-cost mass produc-
tion. This point can be dehnonstrated by the following theoretical
analysis of the possible effects of advertising upon a law firm's out-
put and average cost.
In the short-run, advertising raises a firm's average total cost
curve by the advertising cost per unit: SACI up to SAC2. Thus, for
the given level at Q1, if the advertising cost per unit of service is
measured by AB, total advertising expenditures are equal to the
area of the rectangle C1C2AB. The cost of providing each unit of
service increases from B1Q1 to AQ1 (see Figure 1).
In the long-run, however, the result would be different.
Advertising may shift a firm's demand curve to the right and raise
its long-run average costs (e. g., from LRAC1 to LRAC2, Figure
2), thereby, influencing its economies of scale. For example,
suppose that without advertising, the firm would have produced the
output at Q1 for a unit cost of BQ1 dollars. Then, as a result of
advertising, several possibilities may take place:
POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING UPON A LAW FIRM 'S OUTPUT
AND AVERAGE COST IN THE SHORT RUN AND LONG RUN.






Output of Legal Service
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LRAC 2 (with advertising)~Advertising
C, . .. . Costs ]
Production Costs ,LAC (without adve rt 
i s L ng)
0
Output of Legal Service
CASE I. Advertising may give the firm economies of scale,
enabling it to produce the larger output at Q2 for the lower unit
cost DQ2, even though point D is on a high long-run average cost
curve, LRAC2, than point B.
CASE II. Advertising may have a canceling effect, leaving
output unchanged at Q1 and simply increasing unit costs from BQ1
to AQ1.
CASE III. Advertising may adversely generate diseconomies
of scale, causing the firm to produce the output at Q3 for unit costs
of EQ3.
An examination of events in the past few years may tell us
which one of these theoretical cases will apply truthfully to the
world of reality. At the outset, we can dismiss Case III as unlikely
to occur since monopolistic competition results in firms of less than
optimum size. Here, monopolistically competitive firms create
what economists have often called the "wastes of monopolistic
competition" - the existence of "sick" industries characterized by
chronic excess capacity resulting from too many sellers of
"differentiated" products dividing up the markets, operating
inefficiently at output levels below their minimum average costs,
and charging higher prices. Examples abound in the retail trades -
clothing shops, restaurants, grocery stores. Economic theory and
empirical evidence would not list lawyers under this classification.
Critics of advertising view that the effect of advertising as it
appears in the real world is likely to be explained by the theoretical
Case II above. To them, advertising simply leads to wasteful use of
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resources, contributing nothing but a "zero social product" to our
economy. 10 Criticism that advertising involves economic waste
assumes the following forms:
1. Particularly criticized are emotional appeals, persuasion,
and "tug-of-war" advertising where it is claimed that~the main
impact of advertising is to shift sales among legal firms rather than
to increase the total volume sales of professional services supplied
by the whole legal industry. Advertising of this sort merely
encourages differentiation of the services or goods, and activities
among competing lawyers tend to generate a "canceling effect"
without creating any additional benefit to the lawyers as a group, or
to the consumers at large. Advertising in this sense departs from its
basic function of informing the public and seeks to persuade or to
deceive the public. II Undoubtedly, there is a shifting of demand for
legal services among firms due to several factors including
advertising. But this is what we should expect in a competitive,
dynamic economy. In the shaping, expanding economy of the past
quarter of a century and especially in the wake of rising awareness
of human rights and quality of life of the recent years, we could
hardly expect that total demand for the professional legal counsel
has remained unchanged. Also, one may add that even if market
shares of legal firms were exactly the same as they were before the
introduction of advertising by lawyers, there still would be a major
benefit to consumers despite the alleged "shuffling of existing total
demand" for legal services, in the sense that consumers would use
the particular services of some given lawyers with qualities and
characteristics satisfying their current and proper needs or tastes.
Thus, the extent of "waste" involved - if there really is any -
appears to depend upon whether our economy is operating at its
full-employment capacity. The point to be emphasized is that
resources devoted to advertising can be considered as "wasteful"
only if they could be utilized more efficiently elsewhere.
2. Sometimes, it is stated that advertising succeeds in
generating an expansion of the demand for legal services. This
results in a shift of demand from other services (e.g., insurance,
investment counseling, education, medicine, etc.). The producers
of these latter services will be forced to advertise in an attempt to
recapture their original market share. Such "counter-advertising"
adds more costs and prices to our services and goods. But here
again, all increases in demand for any particular product or service
10. Kaldor, The Economic Aspects ofAdvertising, 18 REV. ECON. STI 0. 1, 6 (1950).
11. R. CAVES, AMERICAN INDI'STRY: STR' CT IRE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE 102 (1964).
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such as legal counsel, do not necessarily represent a diversion from
other services or products. Thus, an expanded demand for more
legal services by the American public is often accompanied by some
corresponding increase in income and in purchasing power flowing
from their increased production.
3. Another variation is the claim that advertising by lawyers is
wasteful because it creates undesirable wants at the expense of
things for which there are greater social needs. If there is any need
for lawyers, it is already there. More advertising simply depletes
the nation's existing total resources; less money will be available to
improve public schools, juvenile delinquency programs, etc. 12 As
Stuart Chase claimed in the late 1920's, "advertising creates no
new dollars." 13 Relating to the same theme is the concern over the
relatively high cost of advertising as a percentage of the firm's total
volume of sales. For instance, the British Reith's Report arbitrarily
selects 5 per cent as the dividing line between "high" and
"reasonable" levels of advertising expenditures. 14 Such cut-off
points are meaningless since the proper relative advertising
expenditures are a function of the service's characteristics. For
instance, it is no accident that advertising costs are relatively high
for low-priced goods which are available from many retail outlets
and which are subject to frequent repeat-purchases (e.g., cosmetics,
drugs, cigarettes, etc.).
Recent experiences throughout the United States contribute
very little to the validity of the criticism of advertising as being
wasteful, at least within the area of advertising activities
undertaken by lawyers. Instead, empirical observations of the new
legal trends in these past three years somewhat justify the
explanation of advertising effects illustrated by the theoretical
analysis in the preceding sections. According to this economic
analysis (Case I above), rnit cost will nevertheless decline from
QiB to Q2D, despite the fact that advertising outlays shift the
average cost curve upward (LRACl to LRAC2). Greater
productive efficiency resulting from economies of scale (output
level OQ1 up to oQ2) more than offsets the increase in unit costs
due to the introduction of advertising. Advertising could act as a
stimulant to a product or a service development. Successful
advertising is frequently based upon the unique and advantageous
12. Federal Reserve of Philadelphia, Advertising and Charlie Brown, Bi s. R EV., June 1§62 at 10.
13. S. CHASE, THE TRAGEDY OFWASTE 112(1978).
14. Commission of Enquiry into Advertising, The Labour Party, REPORT OF A COMMISSION OF
ENQU IRY INTO ADVERTISING 42 (1966).
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features of a lawyer's services. Hence, any lawyer is obligated to
improve his service to provide a reasonable "sales point," such as
OQ2 in Figure 2, for competing profitably in the advertising
sphere. A case in point is the newly established "storefront legal
clinics" which have mushroomed throughout the country in the
past two years. Current operators of these legal clinics maintain
that advertising is vital to them because they must inform and
attract a large number of clients to function efficiently. One of the
largest of these clinics, Cawley, Schmidt & Sharrow, establishes its
headquarters in Baltimore and spreads its 16 branch offices
throughout Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Virginia and the
District of Columbia. 
15
Concomitant to the criticism of advertising as being wasteful is
the problem of inefficiency - higher cost of production and higher
price of service. A majority of economists are very dubious of the
argument that advertising permits 'firms to expand, to achieve
lower unit costs of production, and to offer their services at lower
prices to the public. This suspicion carries added weight in light of
the great cost of advertising in general. Ultimately, consumers
must pay for the cost of all advertising in the prices they pay for
their services. It follows that advertisers must charge higher prices,
or that prices would be lower without advertising. Such a belief
overlooks the lower unit marketing cost that could result from
large-scale production. To the extent that advertising builds a mass
market, it can safely be assumed that advertising facilitates mass
production with its accompanying lower unit costs. But then, even
though a firm might conceivably achieve lower unit cost, is there
any reasof to suppose consumers will invariably receive benefits
through proportionate price reductions? The answer depends upon
the kind of market structure the lawyers are facing. If advertising
were capable of promoting monopoly or oligopoly - a case of
market control by a restricted number of lawyers (or firms) which
will be discussed shortly - then cost reductions in the supplying
process of legal services may contribute only to the enhancement of
profit but not to a reduction in the price of service. However, as
long as advertising activities by lawyers do provide the American
consumers with information more cheaply than alternative sources
of information, including random sampling of services provided by
different legal firms, consumers would certainly respond to
advertising, and lower prices per unit of a given quality will likely
occur.
15. Behind the Spread of Storefront Law, U.S. NEWS& WORLD REP. 55 (Feb. 13, 1976).
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In fact, research has shown that costs of advertising in many
cases are not shifted to consumers at all. 16 Advertising costs are
rarely passed on to consumers because advertising directs
consumers to "brands" with lower prices per unit of quality and
increases elasticities of demand for services, leading these brands to
charge still lower prices per unit quality.
A third major issue of debate on advertising by lawyers centers
around competition versus concentration and monopoly. To an
economist, a perfect competitor is defined as a firm (e.g., a lawyer)
that has no control over the price of the services - in the sense that
the firm faces an essentially horizontal demand curve along which it
can sell as much or as little output as it likes. Imperfect competition
involves some control by each firm over its own price, by virtue of
the fact that there are not a very large number of rivals who sell
exactly the same product (or service) as it does. Main forms of
imperfect competition are: (a) oligopoly - few sellers of similar or
differentiated products, and (b) monopoly - many sellers of
differentiated products. Monopoly power can mean that consumer
choice is restricted, and it can be opposed on the ground that it
restricts individual freedom, as well as on the ground that it results
in an inefficient output level. The general criticisms of monopoly
are rooted in the fundamental notion of resource misallocation
resulting from the restriction of output and higher prices.
Critics of advertising contend that it facilitates the concentration
of monopoly power because large legal firms (or influential lawyers)
can usually afford continuous and heavy advertising, whereas new
struggling lawyers or small firms cannot. On the one hand,
extensive advertising in "open season" creates financial bar-
riers to entry for new lawyers and thereby intensifies the market
power which large, wealthy firms already possess. On the other
hand, by creating "brand" loyalties. customers become less
responsive to price cutting by competitors, thereby enhancing the
monopoly power enjoyed by authoritative, prestigious firms which
are advertising their services. This nefarious impact burdens the
consumers' load further when advertising increases and the
promoters of a product or service have few, if any, unique or
precise claims to make. Statistical evidence of a recent study of the
marketing of ethical drugs in Great Britain illustrates the possibility
of this result. Other studies also indicate that the markets in which
advertising is most effective, and hence, most intensively employed
16. Nelson, Injormation and Consumer Behavior, 78J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970); Nelson, Advertising as
Information, 821. POL. ECON. 729 (1974).
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by influential firms, are not necessarily those in which the value of
providing available information to consumers is greatest. I7 There is
some question whether advertising outlays, even in a situation
where all legal service markets were competitive, would be
allocated among various firms in the efficient fashion. Some
observers contend that advertising, once it is supported
wholeheartedly by members of the legal profession, will embrace
the monopoly power already in ferment among large corporations.
Their case is stated as follows: (a) the large legal firm has the power
of the large purse, which enables it to spend substantial sums of
advertising; (b) advertising thus creates a barrier to new firms
entering the industry; (c) the result is high economic concentration;
(d) because of their protected position and their alleged "service
differentiation," these firms can charge monopolistic prices which
often are too high. Moreover, they must recover the costs of their
advertising by charging higher prices; (e) higher prices result in
excessively large profits for these firms.
The above reasoning follows a rather neat and logical
sequence, yet one still could express some doubt about its final
conclusion. 18  Even though advertising itself constitutes an
additional cost, there is certainly no reason to suppose that cost
tends to promote monopoly or concentration. What is not so
obvious here is the careful distinction between "production costs"
and "selling costs." Some forty years ago, the late Professor
Edward H. Chamberlain of Harvard University argued, in his
famous book, 19  that there are two kinds of costs which
manufacturers, producers, suppliers, or sellers in general incur.
First, they must contract fabrication costs, the costs of producing
what it is they want to sell. Second, they incur additional
expenditures that do not produce the service (or product), or
change it, or improve it, but merely get it sold. Advertising, of
course, is the most obvious example which Chamberlain cited. The
fallacy in the distinction between production costs and selling costs
is fairly easy to notice. Professor Ludwig von Mises gives the
illustration of eating in a restaurant. A man has a choice of two
17. W. Reekie, Some Problems Associated with the Marketing of Ethical Pharmaceutical Products, 9 J.
IN Is. ECON. 47 (1970).
18. Professor Jules Backman expresses doubt about advertising and monopoly power on the
basis of his research. SeeJ. BACKMAN, ADVERTISING AND COMPETITION 4-5 (1967). Professor Kaldor
confirms this thesis stating that no significant relationship exists between advertising intensity and
degree of concentration. See N. KALDOR & R. SILVERMAN, A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF ADVERTISING
E ,PENDITI RES AND THE REVENI JE OF THE PRESS 88-89 (1948).
19. E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETTION 214 (6th ed., 1950). A related
approach was developed almost simultaneously by the British economist, Joan Robinson. See J.
ROBINSON, ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1933).
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places, A and B, serving identical meals, identical food. But in one
restaurant, A, they have not swept the floor for six weeks. How
shall we describe the money spent by the other restaurant, B, in
sweeping the floor? "Production costs" or "selling costs"? Does
sweeping change the food? Certainly not. Surely then, it could be
argued that this is strictly a "selling cost" to restaurant B. It is like
advertising. The food remains the same; but because we have a
worker cleaning out the floor, more customers come to this
restaurant than to the other. But this is nonsense. What you buy is
a meal, served in certain surroundings. If the surroundings are
more desirable, it is a different meal, a different package, so to
speak.
Advertising is, therefore, simply one of the many dimensions
of marketing a product or a service. When caught in a competitive
dilemma, a lawyer can use price or any other feature - quality,
design, appearance, etc. - when trying to outwit his competition.
This is another kind of competition, sometimes called "non-price
competition," sometimes called "quality competition."
Competition in this case takes the form not only of producing the
identical service which your competitors are producing, but also, in
buying the identical resource which your competitors are buying.
For instance, each lawyer tries to make his service a little different
from that of any other lawyer's. He avoids the price competition of
classical "perfect competition." Instead, he introduces brand-
quality competition precisely because it is a profitable form of
imperfect competition. So, competition sometimes means offering
a better service, or perhaps an "inferior" service which is more in
line with what the American consumers are, in fact, desirous of
purchasing.
It advertising does reduce competition and enhance monopoly
power, then there ought to be high levels of advertising in those
industries in which leading firms have a large share of total sales of
the market. This appears to be true for some situations such as
soaps, cigarettes, breakfast cereals, but it is mostly false in others -
drugs and cosmetics, for example. The best way to test the
proposition is to examine the data closely for all consumer-product
industries. Such an examination shows a negligible positive
association between advertising intensity and concentration level.
In other words, the exceptions to the hypothesis nearly outweigh
the conforming cases. If advertising lessens competition and
encourages monopoly, then changes in concentration and
advertising intensity ought to move in the same direction.
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However, data for the 1947-1957 decade, for instance, show, if
anything, the opposite relation -- an inverse association between
changes in advertising intensity and changes in degree of
concentration.
Thus, advertising, on the contrary, could foster competition
by exposing the American consumers to competing services of
lawyers and, thus, enabling these lawyers to gain market
acceptance for their new services more rapidly than they could
without advertising. Once it is a common practice among lawyers,
advertising can decrease barriers to entry for new, struggling
lawyers, and hence, decrease monopoly power of those firms
located in large, strategic metropolitan cities by increasing the
elasticities of demand of existing firms. The rationale for this
conclusion is:
1. With no advertising, consumers might determine the
optimum number of brands of service through the sampling process
until they find the best brand in their sample, and then continue to
purchase this particular brand. Old brands would sell to repeat-
purchase-customers and to new consumers who are sampling. New
brands (e.g., service of lawyers just coming into the market) would
have lower sales in the short-run. Advertising can make entry
easier for these "new'.' lawyers via reduction in concentration.
2. Advertising will likely lead to the elimination of brands of
services with higher price per unit of quality, and to the reduction
of the entry of such service brands. By providing information about
a wide variety of substitute services, advertising tends to diminish
the monopoly power of well-known and well-established legal
firms. In fact, intensive advertising is frequently associated with the
introduction of new services designed to compete with existing
"brands." Competitive advertising is generally used to attract
customers the lawyer does not have - either current non-users of
legal services or customers of the competitors. Thus, advertising in
this fashion is aimed at destroying loyalty to well-established firms.
One could not treat such advertising as a decisive force in building
monopoly!20
II. ADVERTISING, CONSUMER'S INTEREST AND THE
LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
We have examined so far the propriety of advertising by
professionals such as doctors, lawyers, etc., from the economic
20. Brozen, New FTC Policy from Obsolete Economic Dotrine, 3 ANTITRI 'ST L.J. 481 (1973).
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standpoint alone. For instance, we have discussed the possible
economic effects on the consumer, the market and the economy at
large. At this stage, we wish to shift the analysis to the ethical aspect
of advertising, in particular the relation of advertising activities to
the well-being of the public as purchasers of legal services and to the
behavioral ethics of the lawyers as dispensers of those services. Our
attention will focus primarily on two basic questions:
1. Does advertising by lawyers really hinder consumers in
their search for proper, adequate legal services? In other words, is
the ban on advertising by professionals necessary for the protection
of the consumer's interest?
2. If it is not, then what is a reasonable alternative explanation
for the continuation of the ban on advertising?
The immediate reaction to the proposal that doctors and
lawyers be permitted to advertise is at least skepticism and often
abhorrence by a majority of professionals in these fields. Their
common outcry is that without any restrictions of advertising, the
consumers would be unprotected against the hazards of
advertising, especially by the unscrupulousness of some legal
practitioners and "quacks." Advertising, after all, falls within the
scope of a profit-seeking enterprise; it could not constitute the
purview of professionals such as lawyers. For the latter, to advertise
would demean the entire legal profession. Instead of the lawyers
serving the needs of the members in our society, such practitioners
would be no different than the common, ravenous, materialistic
businessman who only looks out for his selfish interest. The
proscription of advertising by lawyers is often written into state
laws as Professional Codes of Ethics on the ground that it is not
only proper, but also legitimate, for the state to protect the safety,
the health and the general welfare of the public within its own
boundaries. The foundation for the consumer's protection view is
anchored on the following three premises:
1. The consumer does not possess enough knowledge to assess
the quality of various legal services.
2., Advertising is unprofessional in the sense that it leads
customarily to a general deterioration of the quality of legal
services.
3. Advertising, by its own nature, deviates the attention from
the inanimate, yet true, object - the nature of the services that the
lawyers offer to the public. Often when professionals advertise,
they tend to promote themselves, rather than spell out the nature
and attributes of their specific services. This self-promotion
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suggests in a subtle way that other practitioners are not quite as
proficient. These suggested comparisons are obviously difficult to
measure, and impossible to substantiate. As a result, unethical or
unfair claims will occur more frequently when advertising is
allowed
Today, in the era of consumerism, it becomes very fashionable
to advocate a ban of advertising by lawyers on the grounds that
such a proscription is necessary to ensure some degree of protection
for the consumer's ignorance. Those poor souls are often at a loss
when they are subjected to a barrage of multi-media advertising
activities. The gullible customers easily become the victims of the
ill-qualified lawyers who will be able to carve out a share of the
market under the circumstances. It would naturally increase the
incidence of shoddy and fraudulent practices of law in the long-run.
The arguments made in Bates and O'Sheen v. State Bar of Arizona,
which were noted in the introduction of this essay, suggest that
lawyers often are in a constant fear of quackery by advertisers. The
threat of quackery can be expected to remain only as long as we
firmly believe that all lawyers are crooks. Obviously, there are
always scoundrels in any group who would use misleading and
deceptive advertising to hook the innocent customers. But this
constitutes an exception rather than a common rule. Those who
stress the incentive of charlatans to deceive, often underestimate
the counterbalancing incentive of consumers to avoid being duped.
Besides, consumers can resort to several available means to cope
with their limited ability to evaluate professional services. One such
way is to patronize the firms offering legal services rather than the
individual lawyer in solo practice. While customers often cannot
tell when they are sold unnecessary, shoddy services, other lawyers
can always monitor the actions of their colleagues. The Kaiser
Foundation Health Plan in California provides an illustration in
the medical field. It is an institutional arrangement which could
become widespread if the market for health services were made too
explicitly competitive by incentive advertising. Such a setting
greatly removes the penchant for providing unnecessary services.
Also the reputation of the group is now at stake. It becomes more
imperative for the entire association to police the quality of services
now being provided. Consumers in this situation are no longer at
the mercy of those suppliers of professional services: if they cannot
evaluate the services they must purchase, they will seek out
institutional arrangements which will protect them.
More often than not, it is the officers of professional
543
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
associations who exaggerate the fear of "deceit" that follows
advertising by professionals. For instance, recently Dr. James
Sammons, AMA's executive vice president, professed in a news
conference in St. Paul, Minnesota on March 13, 1978, that the
AMA does not oppose price advertising by medical doctors, but
that the advertising has a great potential for being misleading.2 '
True, advertising may increase the probability that a "quack" can
capture the attention of the consumers. However, to say that
consumers notice a given practitioner does not mean necessarily
that they will patronize him!
By contrast, a ban on advertising by lawyers could also
decrease greatly the chance that consumers will notice particularly
good practitioners. The legal societies would have us believe that
each practitioner of law is either extremely good or extremely bad.
Under the current mise-en-scene, for instance, a caller to the
county's Bar Association for a referral or for a check on a given
lawyer, is likely to be told that any member in good standing with
the organization and who has the appropriate specialty credentials
is just as good as any other one. Specifically here, no attempt is
made to differentiate among members in good standing. By
contrast, once competitive advertising activities emerge on the
scene, such differences among members of the Bar may be easier
for consumers to discover-
When evaluating the effect of advertising by "quack lawyers,"
we often have the penchant to have the "most naive" consumer in
mind. Instead, we should think of how the "average" consumer
would respond to advertising. If poor practitioners are allowed to
advertise openly, some consumers will probably be bamboozled
into purchasing shoddy or unnecessary services that they otherwise
would not buy. That is a cost of lifting the ban in a free, open
market. However, identifying a cost of an action could not be
considered as a sufficient reason to decide against advertising. The
final decision must rest on the overall balance of cost and benefit we
expect to derive from removing the ban on advertising by lawyers.
Experiences point out that advertising has opened the door for
many low and middle income people to a variety of legal services
that they thought they could never afford. 22 In such a case,
advertising should be permitted even though some gullible
consumers may be made worse off.
Let us turn now. to the second premise: advertising is
21. A,11.4 GhresAd IFiews. Grand Forks Herald, March 15. 1978, at 8D, col. 4.
22. Behind The SpreadofStorrfront Lau-. U.S. NEWs & WORLD REP. Feb. 13, 1978 at 55.
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unprofessional since it will degenerate the quality of services, create
unnecessary costs and raise the price of legal services. Is there any
validity in the contrary argument - will price and quality improve
under the existing ban? As we have discussed in Section I above,
price may or may not be expected to fall even when advertising
costs are added to production costs, depending upon whether the
realization of the economies of large-scale production does indeed
occur or not. The only thing certain is that entry to most
professions is presently hampered by license laws. It is very likely
that prevailing prices are substantially higher than costs, on the
basis of contrived restriction of supply. If advertising and
competitive pressure reduces the costs of comparison shopping for
legal services, prices are almost certain to fall. Lawyers would not
have to cut corners in order to pay for advertising. Thus,
advertising expenditure would be paid for out of economic profits
even as the force of more open competition decreases the size of'
economic profits.
The same competitive force would render it dangerous for a
practitioner to cut corners, because by doing so, it would lead to a
loss of customers. We may conclude safely then that if advertising
were allowed, quality of services would not automatically decline.
Of course, the quality could not be uniform everywhere, because
different consumers have different needs and tastes for price-
quality combinations. Some lawyers living under such an
advertising climate may experiment in finding the price-quality
combinations that best respond to consumer demands. To the
extent that advertising contributes to the consumers' awareness of
alternative practitioners, each lawyer (or seller) would have to be
alert in assuring that the quality of his legal services lived up to the
expectations and desires of his clients. Moreover, since the price of
services would fall, additional people - some part of low-income
and a large section of middle-income groups - would be able and
anxious to purchase legal services that were previously out of their
reach or their customary planning. Instead of relying on neighbors,
friends, relatives, etc., these people could consult frequently the
legal practitioners. The average quality of legal advice and counsel
purchased would improve, even if the average quality given by
lawyers did not change.
Finally, the third premise's contention that open competitive
behavior via advertising would result in less professional
interaction, and, therefore, hamper progress in knowledge and
technique, has no validity at all. Competitive advertising would not
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necessarily diminish the incentive of individual lawyers or groups
of practitioners to promote their professional reputations. If
advertising has any effect in this regard, it would contribute to
fuller awareness of technical advances in the field of law among
lawyers. The claim that advertising would give rise to invidious
comparisons among lawyers ignores the very essence of the
response to advertising in the market for professional services. It is
hard to imagine that many lawyers would assert a supremacy over
any other by name. It is equally hard to believe that many
consumers would be fooled by statements of such supremacy. The
types of ads that will pay off in the market of professional services
are likely those which consumers will not discount too heavily.
Expectation of an increase in occurrences of unethical, unfair
claims by lawyers following the lift of the ban of advertising is
overstated.
From the above discussion, it is not possible to derive any
sensible justification for the prohibition of advertising by lawyers
on the ground of consumers' protection. On the contrary, as was
previously pointed out, in many instances such a ban inhibits
competition, the consumers' guardian angel. Then, what could be
an alternative explanation for the continuation of the proscription?
One persuasive explanation is the view of lawyers as members of a
large, loosely organized "cartel." Under the "cartel" view, the
ban of advertising by professionals serves primarily to enforce
proscriptions against undue competition by members of that cartel.
At the outset, we wish to caution the readers that by no means do
we consider the American professional societies as "cartels" in the
strictest sense of the word. Today, it would be illegal in the United
States and a few other countries for cartels to set prices collusively
and shamelessly in order to maximize their mutual profits. On the
other hand, if a few large firms encounter the same problem,
experience suggests that they may arrive at some tacit mode of
behavior to avoid fierce competition. Strictly defined, a cartel is an
association of firms of the same industry, established to increase the
profits of its members by adapting common policies governing
production, market allocation, or price. A cartel may be domestic
or international in scope. The OPEC oil cartel is popularly referred
to as an "international monopoly." The goal of a cartel is to raise
each member's long run profits to higher levels than would prevail
under competitive conditions. To be successful, therefore, a cartel
must have certain characteristics:
1. Dominant market share - a cartel must control the bulk of
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an industry's total output. Otherwise, the members will not have
sufficient power to influence market prices.
2. Cohesiveness - A member is less likely to cut his price in
order to boost sales and profits at the other members' expense.
3. Price-inelastic demand - The quantity demanded of the
cartel's product must be relatively unresponsive to changes in
price. This means that if the price of the product is increased by
some given percentage, say, 10 per cent, quantity sold declines only
by a smaller percentage - 4 per cent, for instance. There is
nothing shocking about this. If competitors are willing to "chisel"
on conventional market rules by joining the cartel for the purpose
of improving their individual welfare, we must also admit to the
possibility that they will be willing to "chisel" on cartel rules for the
purpose of enhancing their individual welfare. Hence, there is a
built-in incentive which can cause the demise of the cartel.
Professional associations in our modern economy could not be
construed as "cartels" in the strict traditional sense. Yet, a number
of these organizations are continually and actively engaged in the
acquisition of market and political power. But power is never
complete. It is always circumscribed by the imperfect nature of
knowledge and the forces of law, custom, and the market. Thus,
members of these organizations have developed complex sets of
rules to govern the supply of services and prices, and to outskirt the
competitive pressures of the free inarket. Members voluntarily
refrain from competitive bidding since it can be considered as "an
act discreditable to the profession. "24 So, in a broader sense, these
professional organizations behave more or less in the general
direction of a regular cartel.
Because of the built-in incentive for cartel members to collude
and also to chisel, we can anticipate that cartels, if left alone, do not
last long. Normal dissolution of a cartel, however, can be prevented
if the collusive agreement has the force of law. Cheating on the
agreement will not often occur if such cheating is declared a
criminal offense by the state. With legally enforced Professional
Codes of Ethics, an unethical lawyer is one who breaks the cartel's
agreement not to act competitively. He is unethical to his colleagues,
but not to his customers. It is this interpretation that lends credence
to the claim by Messrs. Bates and O'Sheen that legal bans on
advertising are conspiracies in restraint of trade. This view is also
23. For further discussion of employer cartel in sports, see THE DAILY EcONOMIST 57-76 (H.
Johnson and B. Weisbrod, eds., 1973).
24. J. CAREY, THE RIsE OF THE AccOI:NTING PROFESSION TO RESPONSIBILITY AND Ai:THORITY
465-66 (1970).
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what the U.S. Department of Justice had in mind when it
announced that it would bring suit against the American Bar
Association for violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 25 It is also
shared by the Federal Trade Commission when it began in the
early weeks of January 1978 to question the American Bar
Association and some other professionals on the legality of such
traditional practices as restricting advertising, limiting licenses,
and even dictating educational requirements for members.2 6 The
FTC investigations could spark confrontations between the agency
and state licensing boards, since many of the standards that are
being questioned are enforced by state authorities.
Professional Codes of Ethics generally permit the lawyers to
list their names, addresses and telephone numbers in the Yellow
Pages of the telephone directories, and that is all. No lawyer is
supposed to, in any way, differentiate himself from his colleagues in
such listings. Sometimes they are not even allowed to list their
specialties. The consuming public is asked to secure information
about specialties from the professional association themselves; this
is consistent with the cartel interpretation of the Code of Ethics.
Here, the American Bar Association constitutes somewhat the
administrative arm of the cartel. It would want naturally to control
the kinds of information given out about individual members. It
portions out referrals according to a quota much like OPEC sets
production limits of crude oil on member states. One should note
another similarity with cartels: professional associations themselves
advertise the desirability and usefulness of the legal services their
members supply. This fact is also consistent with the cartel view.
Such advertisements attempt to increase the market demand for
services so that the Bar Association will have more business to
portion out to members.
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF ADVERTISING
The economic implications of advertising have been probed
through a number of recent empirical studies. Unfortunately, such
studies are subject to serious problems with respect to both the
acquisition and analysis of relevant data; hence, conclusions are
necessarily tentative. Nevertheless, empirical research suggests that
perhaps the microeconomic effects of advertising are not as adverse
as many critics have traditionally assumed.
25. Guzzardi, A Search For Sanity in Antitrust, FoRr'NE, Jan. 30, 1978 at 72.
26. See, An FTC Challenge to the Legal Profession, B'SINEss WEEK,Jan. 9, 1978 at 23.
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In particular, a substantial portion of total advertising is of an
informative type, and therefore, is a basic means by which
consumers are informed of prices and terms of sales. Furthermore,
advertising does not seem to be a mechanism by which competition
is necessarily reduced. On the contrary, it is frequently a means to
enhance the fair working of a competitive free market.
If, as we have discussed in section II above, the cartel
interpretation of the ban on advertising by professionals is correct,
the removal of these restrictions should result in lower prices for
professional services. While the implications for the quality of these
services are much less clear, there is little reason to expect that such
a quality would decline. Some empirical studies of the effects of
professional advertising can be mentioned here. One is done by
Professor Lee Benham of the University of Chicago (now at
Washington University in St. Louis) measuring the effects of
advertising by optometrists on the price of eyeglasses and eye
examinations. 27 A separate study by Dr. James W. Begrin,
Department of Community Medicine and Hospital
Administration, University of North Carolina, compares the work
of commercial optometrists employed by profit-making firms with
that of professional, non-advertising practitioners. 28 A third study
by ProfessorJohn F. Cady of the University of Arizona, in 1976,
examines the effects of advertising on the prices of prescription
drugs and the quality of pharmaceutical services. 29 Since not all
states ban advertising by optometrists and pharmacists, it is
possible to get some impression of the effects of advertising on
quality and price by (a) looking at price and quality in those states
where advertising is banned; and (b) comparing them to price and
quality in those states where advertising is permitted. The results of
these studies can be summarized here:
1. There are important differences in prices between states
that prohibit only price advertising and those that permit price
advertising.
2. Prices are slightly higher in states where the ban on price
advertising alone is in force than in states with no advertising
restrictions.
3. Prices are considerably higher in states where a ban on all
advertising exists than in states with no advertising or with a ban
only on price advertising.
27. Benham, Advertising, Competition, and the Price of Eyeglasses, J. L. ECON. 337 (1972).
28. The Battle Over Advertising Eyeglasses, CHANGINc TIMES,July 1978 at 42.
29. J. CADY, RESTRICTEi ADVERTISING AND COMPETITION: THE CASE OF RETAIL DRtGS, Study
No. 44 (1976).
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4. The difference in prices between states with a loose ban on
advertising and states with a restrictive ban on advertising is 25 per
cent.
5. Quality of services being offered to consumers does differ
significantly between states with restricted advertising and states
with no restriction; in many types of services, they are about
equivalent in quality.
These empirical studies provide results which are consistent
with the cartel view of the proscription of advertising by
professionals. They are inconsistent with the notion that such
restrictions would benefit the consuming public. Of course,
the studies cited here involve physical products (eyeglasses,
prescription drugs) as well as professional services (eye
examination) and studies which concentrate only on services of
physicians or lawyers may yield different results. Yet, these studies
should give pause to those who would dismiss out of hand the idea
of advertising by lawyers. If a certain legal association continues
adamantly to oppose the movement towards legalization of
advertising by their members, it would seem they are fighting, not
because the public interest is best served by advertising restrictions,
but because they still regard themselves as the administrative arms
of a "cartel."
IV. CONCLUSION AND CAVEAT
What has preceded in these pages cannot be accepted as a
complete analysis of the advertising impact on consumers and our
economy at large. It is simply an investigation of two major issues
of the effect of advertising: (a) the economic welfare of the
purchasers of legal services; (b) the possible conflicts between long-
standing professional Codes of Ethics and the promotion of fair
competition. Nor is the article "the" analysis of advertising by
lawyers; it is only "an" analysis, more can be done by others in the
immediate future.
It is always elegant to conclude an essay on applied economics
with a discussion of the effects of various policy options.
Unfortunately, such elegance must be foregone here.
While the author is not advocating a "free-for-all" kind of
advertising by lawyers, this examination of advertising's impact on
market competition reveals a weakness in the argument for
banning advertising; such a ban should be lifted. In a dynamic and
complex society such as ours, there is an acute need for consumers
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to be closely acquainted with lawyers and their variety of services
over the course of time. Advertising is still the best available
medium that lawyers can utilize to dispense such needed
information. Any advertising should be tailored in terms of the
consumers' total information requirements; therefore, in the
regulation of advertising by State Bar Associations, the consumers'
total information requirements must be considered. Marketers and
critics alike tend often to overestimate the power of advertising to
directly and immediately affect the consumers. Surely some
"consumer learning" occurs. But our knowledge of the nature of
this learning - both the process and the content of learning - is
far from being explicit. There are many pieces of useful
information that lawyers could advertise without infringing upon
their honesty and decency. Since lawyer services are not necessarily
standardized, it would be difficult to draw up precise lists of prices
concerning a variety of services. However, lawyers might advertise
what they charge per hour of their time in performing different
types of work. Information about specialties, normal hours of daily
operation, and availability and terms of credit would probably be
given.
Even if consumers may occasionally encounter some lawyers
who would not mind using "offensive" tactics in their advertising
(offensive to whom and by what criteria? - this is another value
judgment to debate), this essay has shown that there are enough
likely benefits of advertising to justify at least a trial run of openly
competitive advertising by the legal practitioners. Advertising,
despite its costs, contributes to an expanding market for new and
better legal services. Many of these new services that have been
mentioned in this essay would not have been brought to market
unless lawyers were free to develop mass markets through
widespread advertising. Finally, advertising does not take place in
a vacuum. The abandonment of advertising could not represent a
net saving to consumers or to lawyers. Instead, such a development
would require lawyers to seek alternative marketing techniques,
some of which would be less efficient or downright detrimental to
the large mass of people with relatively modest economic means.

